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Employers often use broad language in employee confidentiality agreements to pro-
tect company information. Recently, several administrative agencies have proac-
tively regulated language in these agreements to protect various employee rights, 
including the right to communicate with agencies, bring claims against their em-
ployers, and discuss employment conditions amongst each other. While necessary, 
this recent attention to confidentiality provisions creates a unique regulation issue. 
With so many agencies involved, regulation has the potential to undermine legiti-
mate employer interests in protecting proprietary information and push employers 
to find other problematic ways to control their employees. This comment explores 
interagency coordination as a solution to the potential problems this regulatory 
issue creates. It notes the inefficiencies that current independent regulation creates, 
and common coordination tools that agencies have used in the past to resolve dif-
ficult regulatory questions. Given the unusual difficultly of regulating agreement 
language, this comment finds that flexible coordination tools like joint rulemaking 
and interagency adjudication are feasible solutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanc-
tioned KBR Inc., an international construction and energy-services 
firm, with a $130,000 civil penalty.1 The SEC found that KBR’s em-
ployee confidentiality agreements explicitly prevented employees from 
whistleblowing to outside agencies, in direct violation of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”).2 
 
 † B.A. 2013, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law 
School. The author thanks Professor Douglas Baird for his constant encouragement and feedback 
on this project, and Joseph Wenner and Nathan Enfield for their supportive leadership of The 
Legal Forum. 
 1 Dave Michaels, First Case Against Muzzling Whistle-Blowers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2015, 
1:26 PM CDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-01/sec-sanctions-kbr-in-first-ca 
se-against-muzzling-whistle-blowers. 
 2 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
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Some commentators argue that KBR’s agreements were problem-
atic and merited the SEC’s swift response.3 Others in the financial ser-
vices industry wonder if the SEC went too far. After all, it sanctioned 
KBR for agreements that the firm had not enforced against its employ-
ees.4 In any case, the SEC is setting an enforcement trend for agencies 
troubled by overly broad confidentiality provisions.5 
As agencies like the Commodity Future Trading Commission 
(CFTC) and the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) 
bolster their respective whistleblower policies to match the SEC’s pace, 
other agencies have also been critical of these agreements.6 Notably, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have increased their scrutiny of em-
ployee confidentiality provisions. The NLRB has recently taken on the 
financial services industry, while the EEOC has asserted its right to 
sue employers without receiving a complaint of discrimination.7 
This comment attempts to find a balance between the interests em-
ployers have in confidentiality agreements and the various interests 
agencies have in regulating them. Agencies are right to push against 
broad agreement language that has become an industry standard.8 As 
zealous as enforcement may seem, however, agencies recognize that 
these agreements serve legitimate employer needs. Yet, because these 
agencies have different regulatory interests and enforcement mecha-
nisms, there is a danger that these agencies will establish guidelines 
that are unclear, or overly restrictive when applied in the aggregate. 
As no industry is exempt from the regulations of any one agency, a 
workable interagency policy or enforcement mechanism is a preferable 
 
 3 John A. Chanin & John S. Cutler, Whistleblower Carve-Outs to Confidentiality Agreements: 
Why Attorneys Should Revisit Past Agreements or Risk Liability, 45 COLO. LAW. 15, 16 (2016). 
 4 Eugene Scalia, Blowing the Whistle on the SEC’s Latest Power Move, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 
5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eugene-scalia-blowing-the-whistle-on-the-secs-latest-power-
move-1428271250 [https://perma.cc/4ASA-Z2NF]. 
 5 Ed Ellis et al., OSHA Joins the SEC in Attacking Confidentiality and Other Provisions in 
Private Settlement Agreements, LITTLER LLP (Sep. 19, 2016), https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/osha-joins-sec-attacking-confidentiality-and-other-provisions-private [https://pe 
rma.cc/VZ66-RN7Q]; Gina LaMonica, CFTC Proposes Rules to Align with SEC Whistleblower Pro-
gram, WHITE COLLAR BRIEFLY (Sep. 13, 2016), https://www.whitecollarbriefly.com/2016/09/13/cftc-
proposes-rules-to-align-with-sec-whistleblower-program/ [https://perma.cc/APE6-HU8J]. 
 6 See Ellis et al., supra note 5. 
 7 See Complaint and Notice of Hearing, Bridgewater Associates, LP and [Redacted], NLRB 
No. 01-CA 169426 (Jun. 30, 2016); EEOC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 809 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2015); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–e-17. 
 8 See Robert P. Haney & Cynthia Soohoo, The Dangers of Confidentiality Pacts, COVINGTON 
& BURLING (Feb. 14, 2000), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2000/02/oid 
6364.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ4E-XCWG]. 
24 CHUKWUOGO PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  12:18 PM 
627] CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS 629 
 
solution to individual agency action. This comment argues that coordi-
nated agency activity is a feasible response to this issue given the di-
versity of agency interests involved, and the current inefficiency of in-
dependent regulation. Agencies already take cues from each other’s 
policies, and broader coordination can help agencies create regulations 
and enforce them more efficiently.9 If each individual agency, however, 
continues to take a strong, singular stance against confidentiality pro-
visions, employer confidentiality protections could suffer a death by a 
thousand administrative cuts. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN CONFIDENTIALITY 
PROVISIONS 
In the abstract, administrative agencies regulate and enforce dis-
crete aspects of the public sphere, often under an eponymous congres-
sional act. In reality, these administrative mandates often bleed into 
each other, as one regulatory issue implicates multiple agencies’ dis-
tinct directives. Confidentiality provisions in employee agreements are 
a recent example, as many agencies have grown concerned about em-
ployers impeding their employees’ rights to disclose information to out-
side agencies or amongst each other.10 
A. Employers Rely on Confidentiality Provisions to Protect 
Proprietary Information and Remain Competitive 
Confidentiality agreements are contracts between parties prohibit-
ing one or both parties from disclosing confidential information.11 This 
comment refers to confidentiality provisions as the specific clauses 
found in these and other agreements, such as settlement and severance 
agreements. 
Companies have legitimate interests in keeping their business 
models, client lists, and proprietary information secret. Much of this 
knowledge inevitably rests with their employees. As two commentators 
note, “[t]oday, much of a company’s value exists in employees’ minds,” 
as trade secrets, intellectual property, and general company activity.12 
 
 9 See Ellis et al., supra note 5. With the recent change in administration, it is unclear if en-
forcement will continue to rise, but the problem may present itself again in a future administra-
tion. 
 10 See Chanin & Cutler, supra note 3. 
 11 Rebecca K. Myers, Confidentiality, Nondisclosure and Secrecy Agreements, LEXISNEXIS 
(Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/archive/2015/ 
11/30/confidentiality-nondisclosure-and-secrecy-agreements.aspx [https://perma.cc/22RZ-DCY5]. 
 12 William G. Porter II & Michael C. Griffaton, Using Noncompete Agreements to Protect Le-
gitimate Business Interests, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 194, 202 (2002). 
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While maximizing a business’s industry performance involves keeping 
its activities secret from competitors, the opposite is true for an em-
ployer’s relationship with its employees. Often, the easier it is for infor-
mation flow within a firm or business, the more productive are its em-
ployees.13 Confidentiality agreements encourage this flow of infor-
mation within a company. The more confident an employer feels that 
its information is protected, the more access it is likely to grant its  
employees. 
Confidentiality provisions are also necessary to protect information 
in court. For example, under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1985 
(UTSA)14 and the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA),15 an employer must 
make reasonable efforts to keep its information secret if it wants the 
court to consider that information confidential.16 The USTA defines a 
trade secret as “information . . . that: (1) derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known . . . and (2) is 
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.”17 
Some practitioners assert that these agreements are “the first 
thing a Court will look to in determining whether the employer used 
reasonable efforts.”18 Just as courts will not assume that certain infor-
mation is confidential if it is not proactively defined as such, courts will 
similarly not assume that certain “low-level employees” have confiden-
tial relationships with their employer unless the company defines that 
relationship as well.19  
Importantly, an employer’s interests in its propriety information 
directly impact its employees and society at large. Society needs com-
panies to remain competitive and innovative. In turn, companies need 
to maintain their legitimate right to protect propriety information to 
sustain this benefit to society. Since companies use confidentiality 
 
 13 See Myers, supra note 11. 
 14 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
UNIFORM LAWS (Aug. 9, 1985), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_fi 
nal_85.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW9W-3VLD]. 
 15 18 U.S.C. § 1833 (2012). 
 16 Brad D. Bosomworth, Protecting Customer Lists - Why Have Confidentiality Agreements 
with Employees?, SWEENY, MASON, WILSON & BOSOMWORTH, http://www.smwb.com/corporate-
low-confidentiality-agreements-with-employees [https://perma.cc/97CN-KG3J]. 
 17 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 14, at 5. The 
DTSA similarly defines trade secrets at 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)–(B). 
 18 Bosomworth, supra note 16. 
 19 Janette Levey Frisch, Confidentiality Clauses in Employment Agreements: Who’s Minding 
the Store? Part I, LAW OFFICE OF JANETTE LEVEY FRISCH (Dec. 6, 2012), http://theemplawyerolo 
gist.com/2012/12/06/confidentiality-clauses-in-employment-agreements-whos-minding-the-store-
part-i/ [https://perma.cc/X28S-23Q5]. 
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agreements to control employee disclosure, extreme regulation could 
push employers to control their employees in other ways. For instance, 
a company may seek to protect its proprietary information through 
more restrictive non-compete agreements. 
B. Protecting Employees: Recent Administrative Activity against 
Employee Confidentiality Provisions 
While there are many legitimate reasons for these provisions, agen-
cies must make sure that employers are not protecting themselves at 
the expense of employee rights or administrative interests in discover-
ing illegal activity. The agencies examined in this comment have re-
cently signaled strong policies against confidentiality provisions. While 
each policy alone does not completely strip an employer of proprietary 
protection, their aggregate effect has this potential. As discussed below, 
each agency has a different statute and different enforcement powers. 
This results in different, and sometimes conflicting, regulation that is 
developing at an uneven pace. 
1. The SEC and Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections 
The SEC zealously regulates employee confidentiality agreements. 
Since Dodd-Frank created the Office of the Whistleblower in the SEC 
and the CFTC, the SEC has sanctioned at least three companies in 
widely publicized administrative cases for their suspect provisions.20 
Notably, none of these cases involve the employer enforcing these pro-
visions against an employee. The Commission’s preemptive enforce-
ment actions have struck some as excessive and have left many scram-
bling to revise their agreements.21 
Dodd-Frank amended the Securities Exchange Act of 193422 to add 
Section 21F, entitled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protec-
tion.” In addition to creating a bounty program for whistleblower tips 
to the SEC, rule 21F-17(a) provides that “no person may take any action 
to impede an individual from communicating directly with [SEC] staff 
about a possible securities law violation, including enforcing, or threat-
ening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement.”23 As seen in the agency’s 
decisions against KBR, Inc., BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., and Health Net 
 
 20 See KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1, 2015); BlueLinx 
Holdings Inc., Release No. 78528, 2016 WL 4363864 (Aug. 10, 2016); Health Net, Inc., Release No. 
78590, 2016 WL 4474755 (Aug. 16, 2016). 
 21 Scalia, supra note 4. 
 22 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78qq (2012). 
 23 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17. 
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Inc., the SEC has interpreted this provision to permit preemptive en-
forcement actions. 
In KBR Inc., the SEC sanctioned KBR for requiring employees that 
are involved in internal investigations to sign a problematic confidenti-
ality statement.24 This statement prevented employees from reporting 
the content of any interview related to an internal investigation without 
permission from KBR’s legal department. In place before the promulga-
tion of Rule 21F-17, it read in part: 
I understand that in order to protect the integrity of this review, 
I am prohibited from discussing any particulars regarding this 
interview and the subject matter discussed during the interview, 
without the prior authorization of the Law Department. I under-
stand that the unauthorized disclosure of information may be 
grounds for disciplinary action up to and including termination 
of employment.25 
The SEC found that this language “impedes [communication with Com-
mission Staff ] by prohibiting employees from discussing the substance 
of their interview without clearance from KBR’s law department under 
penalty of disciplinary action including termination of employment.”26 
As a result, KBR “undermin[ed] the purpose of Section 21F and Rule 
21F-17(A), which is to ‘encourage individuals to report to the Commis-
sion.’”27 KBR voluntarily agreed to amend its provisions before the SEC 
delivered its order, and the SEC admitted that it was “unaware of any 
instances in which (i) a KBR employee was in fact prevented from com-
municating directly with Commission Staff about potential securities 
law violations, or (ii) KBR took action to enforce the form confidentiality 
agreement or otherwise prevent such communications.”28 Despite this, 
the SEC enforced a civil penalty of $130,000.29 
About a year later, the SEC released another administrative order 
against BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., for inappropriate confidentiality pro-
visions in several of its employee agreements.30 Before 2013, these pro-
visions prevented employees from disclosing confidential information to 
any third party. For example, a form termination agreement required 
an employee to agree that: “Employee has not and in the future will not 
 
 24 KBR, Inc., 2015 WL 1456619 at *2. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at *3. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See Michaels, supra note 1. 
 30 BlueLinx Holdings Inc., Release No. 78528, 2016 WL 4363864 (Aug. 10, 2016). 
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use or disclose to any third party Confidential Information, unless com-
pelled by law and after notice to BlueLinx.”31 
In 2013, BlueLinx amended the provisions in its severance agree-
ment to include a carve-out for disclosures to administrative agencies. 
This carve-out, however, came with a caveat. It required the “Employee 
[to] understand and agree[ ] that Employee is waiving the right to any 
monetary recovery in connection with any [administrative complaint or 
disclosure].”32 Unsurprisingly, the SEC found these clauses unaccepta-
ble. It noted that the 2013 amended provision “removed the critically 
important financial incentives that are intended to encourage a person 
to communicate directly with the Commission staff about possible secu-
rities law violations.”33 The Commission ordered BlueLinx to include a 
“protect rights provision” in its employee agreements, and imposed a 
$265,000 civil penalty.34 
Only a week later, the SEC released a similar order against Health 
Net, Inc.35 Health Net’s agreements did not prevent employees from 
participating in government investigations or proceedings, but required 
employees to waive “any right to bring a lawsuit against the Company” 
and “any right to any individual monetary recovery in any [government 
investigation or administrative complaint or disclosure].”36 The Com-
mission was “unaware of any instances” in which those agreements de-
terred an employee from communicating with the SEC, or if Health Net 
enforced these agreements against its former employees.37 Still, it found 
that these agreements “directly targeted the SEC’s whistleblower pro-
gram by removing the critically important financial incentives that are 
intended to encourage persons to communicate directly with the Com-
mission staff ” about possible violations.38 The SEC ordered Health Net 
to revise its agreement language and sanctioned it with a $340,000 pen-
alty.39 
 
 31 Id. at *3; BlueLinx defined confidential information as “data and information relating to 
the business of BlueLinx which is or has been disclosed to the Employee or of which the Employee 
become aware as a consequence of or through his relationship to Bluelinx.” Id. 
 32 Id. at *4. 
 33 Id. 
 34 A protected rights provision reminds an employee of her right to report illegal activity and 
file lawsuits with administrative agencies, notwithstanding her responsibility to keep the com-
pany’s information confidential. See Alert – The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
Rules that Confidentiality Provisions Cannot Impede Whistleblower Reporting, BUCHMAN PROVINE 
BROTHERS SMITH LLP (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.bpbsllp.com/663 [https://perma.cc/MA72-CNA2]. 
 35 Health Net, Inc., Release No. 78590, 2016 WL 4474755 (Aug. 16, 2016). 
 36 Id. at *3. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at *3–4. 
 39 Id. 
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2. The NLRB and Section 7 employee rights 
Confidentiality provisions have also provoked the NLRB. While the 
SEC is primarily concerned with unfettered communication between 
employees and Commission staff, the NLRB’s scrutiny is more broadly 
concerned with employees’ rights to communicate with outside agen-
cies, and among each other.40 Indeed, comparing the standards each 
agency uses to regulate confidentiality provisions highlights their dif-
ferent regulatory interests.41 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)42 grants em-
ployees the: 
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, or bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of 
such activities except to the extent that such right may be af-
fected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organ-
ization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 
158(a)(3) of this title.43 
In Kinder-Care Learning Centers,44 the NLRB interpreted Section 
7 rights to include the right of an employee to communicate with their 
employers’ customers, government agencies, and other third parties 
about their employment conditions.45 Under section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 
it is an unfair labor practice “for an employer . . . to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
[Section 7].” 
Comprehensive confidentiality agreements can directly implicate 
an employee’s ability to exercise Section 7 rights under the NLRA. For 
example, in April of 2016, the NLRB released a lengthy administrative 
decision that dissected several confidentiality provisions of an employ-
ment manual.46 In Quicken Loans, Inc., the general counsel of the 
NLRB sued Quicken Loans’ family of corporations for their “Big Book” 
 
 40 Chanin, supra note 3, at 19. 
 41 Compare Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 07-CA-145794, 2016 WL 1445983 (Apr. 7, 2016) with 
KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1, 2015). 
 42 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 43 Id. 
 44 299 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1990). 
 45 Id. at 1172. 
 46 Quicken Loans, Inc., 2016 WL 1445983. 
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employment manual.47 Similar to the SEC proceedings, there did not 
have to be evidence that the employer applied these provisions against 
its employees for the court to find a NLRA violation.48 As long as a pro-
vision “reasonably would be construed as abridging Section 7 activity,” 
it would count as a violation.49 
One example of a provision that the court deemed objectionable was 
the manual’s “suggestion” that employees keep private financial infor-
mation under wraps: “What shouldn’t you share? Non-public financial 
or operational information. This includes strategies, forecasts, commu-
nication that requires a disclaimer, and anything with a dollar figure 
attached to it (rates, programs, quotes, client information, salaries, 
etc.).”50 While Quicken Loans tried to argue that this clause was found 
under the Big Book’s section of “helpful tips and suggestions for using 
social media,” and, therefore, only a suggestion, the court found that “to 
a very real extent, the threat of discipline is inherent in management’s 
suggestions of how employees’ should conduct themselves” and noted 
that “[c]learly, employees have a right under the Act to disclose many 
items ‘with a dollar figure attached.’”51 The court found that because 
this provision was overbroad, it violated the NLRA. 
On the other hand, there were several provisions in the Big Book 
that passed the NLRB’s Section 7 test. Importantly, the court allowed 
provisions that could create liability with the SEC. For example, under 
the Big Book’s “Things We Live By” section, the manual counseled em-
ployees that “[f ]rom time to time, team members may have access to 
private Company information . . . about financial performance, strategy, 
forecasts, etc. Such information is confidential, and may not be shared 
with people or entities outside the Company.”52 The court noted that 
none of the information protected under this clause “is employee infor-
mation or is reasonably directed to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment. . . Employees would reasonably understand 
the rule to relate to their employers’ interest in the security of its pro-
prietary information and not to Section 7-protected information.”53 
The court also dismissed allegations against other provisions that 
arguably violate whistleblower statutes. The Big Book read “in a catch-
 
 47 Id. at 5. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 13. 
 51 Id. at 14. 
 52 Id. at 21. 
 53 Id. 
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all fashion” that “‘improper conduct is not limited to the actions de-
scribed above, but includes any action deemed by the Company to be 
contrary to the Company’s business interests.’”54 Because the court was 
only concerned with protecting Section 7 rights, it found that this clause 
did not violate the NLRB, since “[t]he mere ability to mount an argu-
ment that someone could deem protected [Section 7 related] activity 
threatening or against the Respondent’s business interests or from con-
ducting business does not satisfy the Board’s test for finding an inter-
ference with Section 7 rights.”55 
Following the Quicken Loans decision, on June 30, 2016, the NLRB 
filed an administrative complaint against Bridgewater Associates.56 Re-
lated to an earlier sexual harassment complaint to the NLRB that has 
since been closed, the NLRB alleged that the firm’s form employee 
agreements infringed on Section 7 rights.57 The complaint cited lan-
guage that advised employees that “[f ]or the avoidance of doubt, your 
obligation not to disclose or use Bridgewater’s Confidential Information 
without prior authorization applies in all contexts, industries, and busi-
nesses.”58 The NLRB had scheduled a hearing in December, but settled 
with Bridgewater in October.59 The heavily redacted agreement be-
tween Bridgewater and the NLRB does not disclose what changes 
Bridgewater made to its employment policies, but this action may sig-
nal a more proactive regulatory approach as seen with the SEC.60 
3. The EEOC and Title VII’s equal opportunity protections 
Not to be left out, the EEOC has also filed several lawsuits against 
employers with agreements that prevent employees from reporting dis-
criminatory conduct to the EEOC.61 The EEOC’s interests in the provi-
 
 54 Id. at 24. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Alexandria Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Labor Board Challenges Secrecy in Wall 
Street Contracts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/business/deal 
book/bridgewater-hedge-fund-employee-contacts.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8NHM-8BGF]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Complaint at 2, Bridgewater, N.L.R.B. No. 01-CA 169426; Bridgewater defined confidential 
information in its agreements as “any non-public information relating to the business or affairs of 
Bridgewater or its affiliates, or any existing or former officer, director, employee or shareholder of 
Bridgewater.” Id. 
 59 Stevenson & Goldstein, supra note 56; see Matthew Goldstein & Alexandria Stevenson, 
Hedge Fund Settlement with Labor Board on Worker Rights Stays Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/business/dealbook/bridgewater-associates-labor-board- 
employee-confidentiality-contract-settlement-.html [https://perma.cc/LFN3-EAP5]. 
 60 Goldstein & Stevenson, supra note 59. 
 61 See generally E.E.O.C v. Doherty Enter., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2015); EEOC 
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sions align with the SEC’s, as both agencies seek to preserve an em-
ployee’s full access to their agencies. Unlike the SEC, however, the 
EEOC’s limited administrative powers have left it vulnerable in court.62 
Circuits currently disagree on whether the EEOC has the power to 
begin enforcement actions against companies for the mere threat of 
overly restrictive confidentiality agreements.63 Until the courts resolve 
that question, the EEOC continues to construe its administrative pow-
ers broadly enough to join the administrative fray.64 
4. OSHA and CTFC’s potential for enforcement activity 
Employers have yet to feel the ire of OSHA or the CFTC. OSHA 
recently sharpened its Whistleblower Investigations Manual to prohibit 
confidentiality provisions that prevent employees from participating in 
investigations or testifying at trial.65 OSHA also referenced the SEC’s 
action against BlueLinx as a standard for its enforcement actions.66 
SEC and OSHA, however, still differ in their administrative approach; 
while OSHA has given employers sample carve-out language, the SEC 
is reluctant to do the same.67 
The CFTC has similarly revised its enforcement policies. In Au-
gust, the Commission released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking where 
it anticipated conforming its policies to the SEC’s.68 Changes involve 
“model[ing] aspects of the SEC’s whistleblower program, including (1) 
agency enforcement of whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions; (2) 
prohibition of confidentiality agreements that would restrict whistle-
blowers from providing information to the CFTC, and (3) a reorganiza-
tion of the whistleblower claims review process within the CFTC.”69 The 
Commission also plans to amend its rules to specifically “prohibit the 
 
v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 809 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 62 See CVS Pharmacy, 809 F.3d at 11. 
 63 Doherty Enter., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1310 (finding that the EEOC may bring a pattern 
or practice suit under Title VII without an individual or Commissioner filing a charge or discrim-
ination or an attempt at conciliation); cf. CVS Pharmacy, 809 F.3d at 11 (finding that the EEOC 
did not have this broad power). 
 64 CVS Pharmacy, 809 F.3d at 8. 
 65 Employers Need to Review, Revise Standard Confidentiality Agreements and Policies in Re-
sponse to New Whistleblower Protections under Federal Law, FLASTER GREENBERG (Oct. 19, 2016), 
http://www.flastergreenberg.com/newsroom-alerts-Employers_Need_to_Review_Revise_Standard 
_Confidentiality_Agreements_and_Policies.html [https://perma.cc/Q772-SM7T]. 
 66 Ellis et al., supra note 5. 
 67 Memorandum for Regional Administrators; Whistleblower Program Managers, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., (Aug. 23, 2016) http://www.whistleblowers.gov 
/memo/InterimGuidance-DeFactoGagOrderProvisions.html [https://perma.cc/8R6D-5YWC]. 
 68 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 81 Fed. Reg. 
59551 (Aug. 30, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R Pt. 165). 
 69 La Monica, supra note 5. 
24 CHUKWUOGO PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  12:18 PM 
638  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
enforcement of confidentiality and pre-dispute arbitration clauses re-
lating to actions by potential whistleblowers in any [employment re-
lated] agreements.”70 
II. THE PROBLEM OF AGREEMENT LANGUAGE AND POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 
While the current executive administration has not yet announced 
its policy on this issue, this sample of recent attention to confidentiality 
agreements suggests that more enforcement activity is likely. If so, this 
activity may culminate in a unique administrative issue. Unlike vague 
administrative guidelines, or clearly contradictory rules from different 
agencies imposed upon the same regulated community, the regulation 
of confidentiality provisions gives agencies the potential to regulate 
away an employer’s power to protect its proprietary information. This 
problem is heightened since these agencies are working to regulate 
something as elusive as language. Regulating the air traffic of a busy 
airport, for instance, is not the same as regulating contract language 
that can change quickly or be open to misinterpretation. As a result, 
regulation has to remain flexible and broad enough to capture new pro-
visions that employers might create to control their employee’s commu-
nication. Regulatory flexibility, however, can lead to a lack of notice for 
the regulated community, worsening this issue. 
On the other hand, confidentiality provisions present an oppor-
tunity for interagency coordination. These agencies want to regulate 
employee agreements for different reasons, but they all agree that the 
current, broad confidentiality standard is running afoul of administra-
tive policies. This comment will argue that: 1) the difficulty of protecting 
rights by regulating agreement language creates a high potential for 
inefficient administrative policies, 2) independent agency enforcement 
is not enough to properly regulate confidentiality agreements since each 
agency has different interests to advance, and 3) interagency coordina-
tion is a preferable solution for future regulation of confidentiality pro-
visions. 
A. The Difficulty of Protecting Rights by Regulating Agreement 
Language Creates a High Potential for Inefficient Administrative 
Policies 
At first glance, there appears to be a simple solution to confidenti-
ality provision regulation. As the SEC required of KBR and BlueLinx, 
 
 70 Id. 
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for example, each agency could require employers to include a “pro-
tected rights provision” in their agreement, which would remind em-
ployees of their right to communicate with a third-party agency.71 In 
particular, the SEC required KBR to include a protected rights provi-
sion in its employee agreements, which read: “Nothing in this Confiden-
tiality Statement prohibits [the employee] from reporting possible vio-
lations of federal law or regulation to any governmental agency or 
entity.”72 A provision addressing the whole universe of administrative 
authority would at least let employers feel confident that they are 
aware of all interested agencies. 
Protected rights provisions, however, may not cover all the rights 
that agencies consider. While a simple protected rights provision may 
be adequate for agencies concerned with whistleblower rights like the 
SEC, CTFC and OSHA, agencies like the NLRA and the EEOC must 
regulate around the subtler ways that confidentiality provisions pro-
hibit communication amongst employees and the filing of complaints. 
For example, in 2014, the EEOC sued CollegeAmerica for its sepa-
ration agreements that conditioned post-employment benefits on the 
waiver of future claims to any government agency.73 The SEC itself is 
reluctant to rely on protected rights provisions, as the SEC Officer of 
the Whistleblower Chief Sean McKessy expressed in 2015.74 McKessy 
made clear that the amended KBR provision should not be considered 
a “‘safe harbor,’” since agreement language can seem appropriate in one 
context and offensive in another.75 
The difficulty of pinning down language that works for any one 
agency, in any context, means that agencies must be flexible and evolve 
their regulations in tandem with novel agreement language. If agencies 
do not communicate with each other, however, regulation is likely to 
diverge, especially if policies are constantly reacting to new language. 
In turn, divergence can lead to inefficiency and make it difficult for the 
regulated community to comply. Of course, agencies could have no reg-
ulation or proactive enforcement to respond to this regulatory chal-
lenge. This solution, however, would leave employees extremely vulner-
able, given how broad confidentiality language has become. Shifting the 
 
 71 BlueLinx Holdings Inc., Release No. 78528, 2016 WL 4363864, at *5 (Aug. 10, 2016). 
 72 KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 2015 WL 1456619, at *3 (Apr. 1, 2015). 
 73 CollegeAmerica Sued by EEOC for Age Discrimination and Retaliation, EEOC (Apr. 5, 
2014), https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/5-5-14.cfm?renderforprint=1 [https://perma. 
cc/GD5C-6K8G]. 
 74 Ada W. Dolph, Aggressive Enforcement Efforts Will Continue After KBR, Per SEC Whistle-
blower Chief, SEYFARTH SHAW (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/OMM042215-
WB [https://perma.cc/7KZD-EJLA]. 
 75 Id. 
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burden to employees to know and enforce their rights against employers 
with the usual imbalance of power in employment relationships would 
likely lead to less whistleblowing and labor activism. Instead, agencies 
must find a way to proactively contend with this regulatory issue. 
B. Independent Agency Activity Is Not Enough to Efficiently 
Regulate This Issue, as Each Agency Has Different Interests to 
Advance 
Each agency has a distinct agenda when it comes to regulating con-
fidentiality provisions. This means that an agency can only offer guide-
lines and sanction employers in relation to the rights given under its 
mandate. A company caught red-handed by OSHA, for example, may be 
penalized and receive a specific directive that keeps it in compliance 
with OHSA in the future, but may still be open to sanctions from the 
SEC if that company does not stay abreast of SEC enforcement activity. 
For example, in Quicken Loans, the administrative judge dismissed 
certain allegations of overly broad confidentiality provisions, even 
though the language resembled provisions that the SEC had recently 
sanctioned. One provision in Quicken Loans’ manual cautioned employ-
ees that “[t]he unauthorized disclosure [of company information] is 
strictly prohibited and is a serious matter that will result in immediate 
separation of employment and, if necessary, criminal or civil legal ac-
tion.”76 The court found no legal violation in this provision since its lan-
guage would not “reasonably result in an employee understanding pro-
tected activity to be barred by this provision.”77 It is seems unlikely, 
however, that other agencies would allow this language, especially 
agencies enforcing whistleblower statutes. 
Independent agency enforcement is thus unlikely to prevent future 
conflicts in confidentiality provision regulation. As one commentator 
noted, “seriatim mandates from each government and regulatory body 
for a carve-out . . . repeated in each related provision is both impractical 
and impossible.”78 Instead, there needs to be proactive regulation from 
each agency which, when applied together, efficiently protects employ-
ees while leaving employers reasonably free to protect their proprietary 
interests. As discussed below, one solution that meets these needs is 
interagency coordination. 
 
 76 Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 07-CA-145794, 2016 WL 1445983, at *25 (Apr. 7, 2016). 
 77 Id. at *27. 
 78 Nancy Morrison O’Connor, Preventing Release from Releases as Federal Agencies Attempt 
to Put Separation Agreements Asunder, THE ADVOCATE (2014), https://info.bracewelllaw.com/37/ 
388/uploads/the-advocate.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ3C-3KEB]. 
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C. Interagency Coordination Is a Preferable Vehicle for Heightened 
Administrative Scrutiny of Confidentiality Provisions 
The issue presented is a regulatory space—confidentiality provi-
sions—that involves more agencies than a first impression would re-
veal. Interagency coordination could help these agencies carry out their 
distinct statutory directives and prevent conflicting and inefficient reg-
ulation. Specifically, an ideal coordination tool would: 1) increase notice 
to companies of each agencies’ policy towards confidentiality provisions, 
2) increase communication among these agencies so their regulators 
would stay informed of each agencies’ policies, and 3) strike a balance 
between protection of employee rights and employer proprietary inter-
ests. Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi’s seminal article, Agency Coordina-
tion in Shared Regulatory Space, provides a useful framework to under-
stand the specific tools agencies have used to achieve these goals.79 
1. Instances of shared regulatory space 
Freeman and Rossi first propose four categories of multiple-agency 
delegations, or four ways that Congress delegates agency directives that 
create shared regulatory spaces: (1) overlapping agency functions, (2) 
related jurisdictional assignment, (3) interacting jurisdictional assign-
ments, and (4) delegations requiring concurrence.80 While not an ex-
haustive list of categories, this gives some of the most common causes 
of shared regulatory spaces that often benefit from coordination tools. 
The first type of delegation, overlapping agency functions, gener-
ally occurs where “lawmakers assign essentially the same function to 
more than one agency.”81 Within the context of confidentiality provi-
sions, the shared whistleblower protection directives between the SEC, 
CFTC and OSHA (“whistleblower agencies”) closely illustrate the re-
sulting regulatory space. The discussed regulatory conflict, however, 
lies less with these whistleblower agencies that have already proposed 
similar enforcement policies, and more with the differences between 
these agencies’ goals and those of the NLRB and EEOC. 
The second type of delegation, related jurisdictional assignment, 
also partially describes the problem of confidentiality provision regula-
 
 79 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
 80 Id. at 1145. 
 81 Id. 
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tion. Freeman and Rossi describe this type of delegation as “where Con-
gress assigns closely related but distinct roles to numerous agencies in 
a larger regulatory or administrative regime.”82 
The American food safety system provides an example of this reg-
ulatory space.83 In this system, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) per-
form the same regulatory function of “standard setting designed to en-
sure the safety of the food supply,” although over different food prod-
ucts.84 Also within this regulatory space is the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), which is responsible for food security, and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), which regulates pesticide levels and 
residue in food commodities.85 
Like confidentiality provisions, in the American food safety exam-
ple there are several agencies implicated in the same regulatory space. 
These agencies, however, share regulatory space because they have in-
terrelated directives over food safety and security. Overlapping juris-
diction is much more likely. Confidentiality provisions instead is a nar-
row regulatory issue that happens to affect a variety of regulatory 
interests. 
The third type of delegation examined, interacting jurisdictional 
assignments, most closely describes confidentiality provisions overall. 
Interacting jurisdictional assignments are “situations where Congress 
creates situational interdependence among agencies that have different 
and potentially incompatible primary missions.”86 Border patrol is a 
vivid example. While the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS, and various federal land 
agencies “perform different functions and have unique missions under 
separate statutes,” border patrol implicates each agency’s interests.87 
Like confidentiality provisions, border patrol is a regulatory space 
that happens to implicate a variety of interests, instead of related 
agency directives that necessarily implicate each other. Border patrol 
also brings together certain agencies whose regulatory goals would oth-
erwise seem unrelated, as seen in this comment with the SEC and 
NLRB. 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1147. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 1148. 
 87 Id. at 1149. 
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2. Common coordination tools 
Administrative agencies often use a variety of coordination tools to 
deal with the mentioned instances of shared regulatory space. These 
tools, and their past application, are instructive to confidentiality pro-
visions. Freeman and Rossi give four types of common coordination 
tools: (1) consultation provisions, (2) interagency agreements, (3) joint 
rulemaking and (4) centralized White House Review.88 
a. Consultation provisions and memoranda of understanding 
Consultation provisions and interagency agreements are the least 
binding types of coordination tools. Agency consultation can occur when 
Congress requires or expressly permits an agency to consult with other 
agencies whose missions are implicated in the first agency’s policies.89 
Even without express legislative approval, agencies may consult each 
other as long as Congress does not prohibit their interaction.90 Some 
agencies, however, might be reluctant to consult other agencies unless 
it is explicitly authorized, and consultation does not guarantee that an 
agency will change or modify its policy.91 For this case, there is some 
evidence that the whistleblower agencies would not have an issue en-
gaging each other in a consultative process, especially since the CFTC 
and OSHA are already considering the SEC’s enforcement strategy.92 
The more important issue is the conflict between the NLRB and the 
SEC’s policies regarding these provisions, which would probably need a 
stronger solution. 
A common example of interagency agreements is the Memorandum 
of Understanding, or the MOU.93 Agencies usually enter into MOUs at 
their own discretion, since there are no statutory or executive policies 
that dictate MOU provisions.94 Freeman and Rossi give five common 
purposes for MOU agreements: “(1) delineating jurisdictional lines, (2) 
establishing procedures for information sharing or information produc-
tion, (3) agreeing to collaborate in a common mission, (4) coordinating 
reviews or approvals where more than one agency has authority to act 
 
 88 Id. at 1157, 1161, 1165, and 1175. 
 89 Id. at 1157. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. Agencies may be reluctant to consult other agencies without explicit legislative author-
ization because they would not want to be seen as overstepping the authority that Congress has 
granted them. 
 92 See LaMonica, supra note 5; Ellis et al., supra note 5. 
 93 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 79, at 1161. 
 94 Id. 
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in a particular substantive area and (5) . . . agreeing on substantive 
policy.”95 
An MOU with the fourth type of purpose usually involves several 
agencies.96 One example Freeman and Rossi give is the 2009 MOU be-
tween nine federal agencies to coordinate regulation over the siting of 
electric transmission lines on federal lands.97 To reduce the delays in 
siting transmission projects, Congress instructed the Department of 
Energy (“DOE”) to coordinate the process among eight other agencies.98 
These agencies signed an MOU in 2006 to clearly delineate responsibil-
ities, with a sequential system of review.99 As Freeman and Rossi note, 
however, this MOU did not do enough to galvanize a more efficient pro-
cess.100 The Obama administration still found the siting process too de-
layed, so the agencies signed a second MOU in 2010.101 Federal siting 
has since improved, although the Obama administration issued subse-
quent executive directives to further expedite the process.102 
The DOE example illustrates that MOUs would make a useful tool 
for agency coordination of confidentiality provisions. Congress and the 
executive branch consider MOUs an appropriate response to coordina-
tion issues. An MOU between the agencies highlighted in this comment 
could, for example, set up a system of information sharing about what 
provisions an agency has already deemed illegal. They could also agree 
to an alert system where agencies would inform each other of proceed-
ings against an employer. The other agencies could decide to review the 
confidentiality provisions of that employer and issue a warning if the 
provisions also violate their policies. This way, while an employer is in 
an enforcement proceeding with one agency, it can adjust its agreement 
language to fit the policies of all potentially interested agencies, instead 
 
 95 Id. at 1161. 
 96 Id. at 1163. 
 97 Id. at 1164. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.; see also Mem. of Understanding Among the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Dep’t of Commerce, 
Dep’t of Def., Dep’t of Energy, Envtl. Protection Agency, the Council on Envtl. Quality, the Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, the Advisory Council on Historic Pres., and Dep’t of the Interior Re-
garding Coordination in Fed. Agency Review of Elec. Transmission Facilities on Fed. Land, (2009) 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Transmission%20Siting%20on%20Federal%20Lands%20MOU 
%20October%2023%2C%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8QZ-LYYA]. 
 102 WHITE HOUSE, MODERNIZING OUR ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE AND DRIVING 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLEAN ENERGY 2 (July 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/modernizingourelectrictransmission.pdf [https://perma.cc/LLB3-EYQW]. 
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of only adjusting language to the outcome of the enforcement proceed-
ing. This would partially resolve notice issues seen in the current regu-
latory approach. 
While MOUs are helpful, they are not binding. Freeman and Rossi 
explain that “agencies may negotiate MOUs but then let them languish, 
sometimes for years.”103 MOUs are also not legally enforceable.104 As 
seen with the DOE example, even with pressure from Congress, the 
agencies did not fully address the siting delays and had to renegotiate 
their MOU four years later.105 Sticking with an MOU for confidentiality 
provisions might present a bigger challenge. There has not been legis-
lative or executive pressure to coordinate agency activity in this area. 
Additionally, since the regulated community would bear most of the 
costs of conflicting policy, there are fewer incentives for the mentioned 
agencies to coordinate with each other. 
b. Joint rulemaking 
Joint rulemaking occurs when two or more agencies create policies 
together, usually through jointly issued statements or guidelines.106 
Agencies often use joint rulemaking to solve coordination problems, and 
Congress may sometimes mandate this type of collaboration.107 Among 
joint rulemaking’s benefits, it can reduce compliance costs for the regu-
lated community and reduce conflicting policy.108 
One major joint rulemaking example is the rules that the EPA and 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) created 
for greenhouse gas emissions and fuel efficiency standards. If these 
agencies had independently set these standards, they likely would have 
created inconsistent regulatory regimes for three reasons.109 
First, the two agencies have distinct missions; the EPA protects the 
environment and public health, while NHTSA has a duty to ensure auto 
and vehicle energy conservation.110 These different mandates mean 
that the agencies were likely to regulate the same issue with different, 
and possibly conflicting, priorities in mind. Second, the agencies acting 
alone likely would have used different models for estimating the cost 
 
 103 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 79, at 1165. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 1164. 
 106 Id. at 1165. 
 107 Id. at 1167. 
 108 Id. at 1165. 
 109 Id. at 1170. 
 110 Jodi Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lesson from the “Car 
Deal”, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 357–58 (2011). 
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and pace of technology innovation, which help them determine the 
standards to set for the industry. Finally, separate agency regulation 
would have potentially led to different enforcement schemes.111 For ex-
ample, NHTSA has the statutory power to “allow[ ] manufacturers to 
pay fines for non-compliance,” but the EPA does not have the same to 
power to allow fines as an “intentional compliance strategy.”112 
 NHTSA and the EPA averted these regulatory pitfalls through 
joint rulemaking. They set separate standards for fuel efficiency and 
greenhouse gases, but made sure their standards aligned so that “man-
ufacturers could build a single fleet of vehicles to comply with both.”113 
Per a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the agencies’ 
partnership, the joint rulemaking process influenced a greater level of 
regular collaboration between each agency’s staff.114 
Joint rulemaking can create a norm of collaboration across agen-
cies, and possibly between agencies and the regulated community. To 
create their emissions standards, the EPA and the NHTSA “engaged in 
substantial outreach to the auto industry,” including “considerable con-
sultation and exchange of information” with manufacturers.115 It is not 
clear that agency coordination always leads to more engagement with 
the regulated community to set policy. But collaboration between agen-
cies could lead to greater consideration of the private interests involved, 
since agencies have already agreed with each other that they must 
reach beyond their own expertise to create good policy. Industry influ-
ence on administrative policy is not always a good thing, but can be 
beneficial for developing complex policy. 
The EPA and NHTSA, however, may be a unique example of joint 
rulemaking since there was a strong political will fueling the agencies’ 
collaboration.116 Indeed, the White House signaled a strong investment 
in the policy when President Obama announced the joint rulemaking 
plan in a Rose Garden ceremony.117 With the President’s influence, the 
collaboration between the EPA and the NHTSA became a major victory 
for the Obama administration. The joint standards “imposed a truce 
 
 111 Id. at 356–57. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 359. 
 114 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 79, at 1171; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-10-336, VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY: NHTSA AND EPA’S PARTNERSHIP FOR SETTING FUEL 
ECONOMY AND GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS STANDARDS IMPROVED ANALYSIS AND SHOULD BE 
MAINTAINED 20 (2012). 
 115 Freeman, supra note 110, at 362–3. 
 116 Id. at 374. 
 117 Id. at 368. 
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on[ ] a thirty-year battle over fuel efficiency standards that had played 
out in Congress and the courts.”118 
Confidentiality provisions seem unlikely to receive the same polit-
ical attention. If political will were not a potential problem, however, 
the benefits of joint rulemaking would be immediate. Joint rulemaking 
would alert employers to rights they may be violating with their con-
tracts in one set of guidelines, which could reduce compliance costs. A 
single set of guidelines, moreover, would reduce the potential for con-
flicting policy. Finally, a norm of collaboration between these agencies 
could also be valuable, especially if they find themselves in the same 
regulatory space for a future issue. A norm of collaboration is already 
developing for those agencies, including the SEC and the CFTC working 
to fulfill the heavy rulemaking mandate of the Dodd-Frank Act.119 
c. Centralized White House review 
The fourth coordination tool Freeman and Rossi examine is cen-
tralized White House review. White House review generally occurs 
through policy offices and councils that the executive can create to ad-
dress a specific regulatory issue.120 The officials that run these offices 
are usually members of the President’s senior staff.121 This often gives 
policy offices substantial political capital, as “[officials’] real or per-
ceived proximity to the President provides them with significant influ-
ence and equips them with an impressive inventory of both formal and 
informal tools of persuasion.”122 
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is one ex-
ample. Under Executive Order 12,866, the OIRA had the power to “re-
view regulatory actions for consistency with presidential priorities, 
statutory mandates,” and other agencies’ regulations.123 With yearly re-
ports of all agencies’ policy plans, the OIRA has the power and infor-
mation to encourage agencies to coordinate with each other.124 Some 
argue that OIRA is, “in large part, an information aggregator” whose 
daily operations “largely involve interagency coordination.”125 The 
 
 118 Id. at 364. 
 119 Dodd-Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK & WARDELL LLP (2016), https://www.davispolk. 
com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report/ [https://perma.cc/KKF7-J4G9]. 
 120 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 79, at 1177. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 1178. 
 124 Id. at 1180. 
 125 Cass Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2013). 
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OIRA manages a comment and review process of proposed rules re-
ceived from other agencies, but the OIRA does not submit its own com-
ments.126 
OIRA can greatly reduce the potential for conflicting policies over 
confidentiality provisions. Its information gathering function would 
make it easy for agencies to know which other agencies have regulatory 
interests in these provisions. The comment process would allow agen-
cies to engage each other’s policies before promulgation, which would 
weed out inconsistencies and help develop clearer policies in general. 
OIRA’s authority, however, only explicitly covers executive agencies, 
and there is some debate over whether independent agencies should 
have to submit proposed rules.127 Congress introduced the Independent 
Regulatory Agency Analysis Act of 2012 (“Act of 2012”), which would 
have allowed the President to issue another executive order to create a 
similarly centralized review process for independent agencies, but it 
was not enacted.128 As most of the agencies involved in this issue are 
independent (CFTC, NLRB, OSHA and SEC), OIRA is not the best op-
tion for coordination unless Congress considers another bill like the Act 
of 2012. 
Another facet of White House review is presidential manage-
ment.129 The President has influence over all agencies, although Free-
man and Rossi caution that the President’s directive power over inde-
pendent agencies is constrained by his or her limited appointment and 
removal powers.130 This is a fair point, although some scholars argue 
that the President has more influence over independent agencies than 
traditionally thought.131 Indeed, some suggest more broadly that the 
distinction between executive and independent agencies is artificial, 
and instead agencies should be considered on a spectrum of independ-
ence from the executive branch.132 For the purposes of this comment, 
these arguments show that presidential review is more of a feasible co-
ordination tool for independent agencies than Freeman and Rossi sug-
gest. 
 
 126 Id. at 1846. 
 127 VIVIAN S. CHU & DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42720, PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW 
OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKING: LEGAL ISSUES (2012), https://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R42720.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP9V-RK3G]. 
 128 Id.; see Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 129 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 79, at 1175. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agen-
cies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013). 
 132 Id. at 769. 
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The traditional distinction between executive and independent 
agencies is for-cause removal.133 A for-cause removal provision in an 
agency’s statutory mandate limits the President’s power to remove an 
agency head only for cause of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea-
sance in office.”134 Agencies are thought to be independent because of 
this statutory protection, but not every independent agency has for-
cause removal; the SEC and CFTC are two examples of agencies that 
do not.135 There is, in fact, no universal feature that distinguishes all 
independent agencies from all executive agencies.136 
Moreover, the President still appoints the heads of most independ-
ent agencies, who ultimately control the agencies’ activities and priori-
ties.137 The turnover of agency heads also occurs more frequently than 
their term limits would cause, because agency heads tend to resign 
when the opposing party’s candidate is elected.138 A popular administra-
tion can also have great reputational sway over agencies, and in general 
the President can use informal methods to control agendas.139 Finally, 
interagency coordination might actually increase a president’s influ-
ence over an independent agency if it is sharing regulatory space with 
an executive agency.140 
d. Interagency adjudication 
Another type of coordination tool not discussed by Freeman and 
Rossi is interagency adjudication. Interagency adjudication occurs 
when agencies coordinate to adjudicate “public benefit and penalties,” 
usually through individually controlling different steps of an adjudica-
tive process.141 Asylum application processing, for example, involves 
this type of adjudication.142 The DOJ and the DHS coordinate investi-
gation and fact-finding, and issue initial and appellate-level adminis-
trative decisions.143 Also involved is the State Department for interna-
tional relations concerns, and the Department of Health and Human 
 
 133 Id. at 772. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 786. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 818. 
 138 Id. at 821. 
 139 Id. at 822 (internal quotations omitted). 
 140 Id. at 823. 
 141 Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 807–
08 (2015). 
 142 Id. at 815. 
 143 Id. 
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Services (HHS) for fact-finding in cases involving minor or mentally in-
competent applicants.144 
Interagency adjudication has the greatest potential for coordinat-
ing confidentiality provision enforcement since the SEC, CFTC, OSHA, 
and the NLRB all have adjudication powers. Agency adjudication usu-
ally has two parts: fact-finding and application of the law. Interagency 
adjudication often involves multiple agencies separating these two 
roles.145 For confidentiality provisions, we could imagine a process 
where agencies had the option to add their own claim against an em-
ployer’s agreement language after another agency begins an enforce-
ment proceeding. This would require information sharing at the fact-
finding stage. The agency that began the enforcement proceeding would 
also produce the administrative decision, but the employer, aware of its 
violations of other agencies’ policies through this multi-claim system, 
would be able to modify its language to address all claims. If, by the end 
of that proceeding, the employer did not modify its language to address 
all claims presented, the other agencies could bring another proceeding 
against that employer. 
This system would prevent an employer from facing multiple pro-
ceedings without notice and would encourage agencies to communicate 
with each other. It would also maintain regulatory flexibility for agen-
cies that do not want to set specific rules that crafty agreement drafters 
will learn to evade. This greater collaboration could also lead to more 
uniform policies and enforcement approaches that still allow employers 
effective control over proprietary information. 
Interagency adjudication, like the other coordination tools dis-
cussed, has its limits. As seen with consultation and MOUs, there is no 
way to formally bind the agencies unless there is an executive order or 
statute.146 It would also slow down the adjudication process, which can 
make regulation more uncertain for the regulated community. In the 
asylum example given, the DOJ and DHS faced a class action lawsuit 
when they could not agree on the terms of their “asylum clock.”147 The 
asylum clock helps determine if an applicant can become authorized to 
work if his or her application is still pending due to delays.148 
Similarly, interagency adjudication is vulnerable to obstructionist 
measures. For example, an agency may be opposed to adding its claim 
 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Indeed, informal interagency adjudication usually occurs through MOU agreements. See 
Jennifer Nou, Agency Coordinators Outside of the Executive Branch, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 64 
(2015). 
 147 Shah, supra note 141, at 816. 
 148 Id. at 815. 
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to another agency’s proceedings, or might try to control that those pro-
ceedings, rendering the whole process inefficient. Just like joint rule-
making, there would have to be a strong political will to maximize the 
efficiency of the process. If the will were there, however, interagency 
adjudication would properly address the issues of the current regula-
tory scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many tools available to agencies dealing with shared reg-
ulatory spaces. For the problem of confidentiality provisions, most of 
these tools would provide a feasible means of interagency coordination. 
Of them, joint rulemaking and interagency adjudication seem to be the 
strongest solutions, but are also the most vulnerable to low political 
will. Agencies must have great enough incentives to apply these tools 
over a sustained period and bear the initial costs of coordination. With 
the recent change in administration, it is difficult to gauge how enforce-
ment trends will develop. But if Congress, the new administration, or 
the agencies themselves find that this issue becomes an important reg-
ulatory quagmire in the future, these are some solutions to consider. 
